Polarization of What? A Model of Elections with Endogenous ValenceWe build a model of electoral competition over two dimensions: policy and valence. The model studies the connection between three types of elite polarization: platform polarization, valence polarization and preference polarization. We also study the costly decision of candidates to increase their non-policy assets, that is, we treat valence as endogenous. Candidates will in general not converge to one another in the policy dimension nor in the valence dimension. A candidate's preferences are positively, but not perfectly, correlated with her platform. Surprisingly, there are circumstances under which candidates' platforms will diverge when their preferences converge. We predict a positive correlation between campaign spending and platform polarization.
Version with appendix and proofs
Why Primaries? The Party's Tradeoff between Policy and Valence Our theory studies why and when political parties choose to hold competitive primary elections. Party leaders face a trade-off between primary elections and elite-centered nominations. The benefit of a primary is to acquire information about the campaigning skills of candidates. Its cost is the ideology that primary voters might induce on policy platforms. We find that primary elections are more likely to be used when the party leadership and the potential primary voters are ideologically similar. We also find that opposition parties and weak parties benefit from primaries more than incumbent parties and strong parties do. Intriguingly, extremist parties are more likely to adopt primaries than centrist parties are. Contradicting previous research, we find that primaries are more attractive when candidates' skills are less salient for voters than candidates' policies.
Working paper
Una lectura crítica de la reforma electoral en México a raíz del 2006A raíz de la crisis postelectoral del 2006 se hicieron importantes cambios a la Constitución así como a varias leyes secundarias en México. El objetivo de este ensayo es analizar cuatro problemas generados por esta nueva legislación: (1) el debilitamiento de la autonomía del Instituto Federal Electoral, (2) la escasez de información en el debate político, (3) la hegemonía de las élites partidistas, y (4) la incertidumbre en el caso de elecciones cerradas. En base a una lectura minuciosa de las nuevas normas, este ensayo documenta dichos riesgos y discute su posible impacto en los procesos democráticos del país. Sugerimos tres nuevas reformas: elecciones internas en los partidos, una segunda vuelta electoral, y la elección directa de consejeros electorales.
Política y Gobierno, CIDE, Vol. XVI, Number 2, Semester II, 2009, pp. 411-427
A Chance for Peace? Recommendations from Negotiation Theory to Demobilize the Paramilitaries in ColombiaThis paper analyzes the ongoing negotiations to demobilize thirteen thousand illegal paramilitaries
in Colombia by December 2005. The stakes for the Colombian people are great: success
in these negotiations would go a long way in solving their thirty-nine-year-old civil war.
The paper describes the historical context for the negotiations and closely analyzes the parties,
their interests, and their alternative strategies. Several concepts from negotiation theory, psychology,
and economics are brought into the analysis to make recommendations on the steps
that could be taken to reach a successful agreement.
Kennedy School Review, Harvard University, Vol. 5, May 2004, pp. 65-83