OECD II: Economic Growth After the Fall

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OECD macroeconomic performance

	OECD	EU	USA	JAPAN	GERMANY	FRANCE	ITALY	UK
Output Growt	th (per cent	per annun	n)					
1960-73	4.9	4.7	4.0	9.7	4.3	5.4	5.3	3.1
1973-79	3.2	2.6	2.9	3.5	2.4	2.7	3.5	1.5
1979-89	2.9	2.2	2.8	3.8	2.0	2.1	2.4	2.4
1989-99	2.6	2.0	3.0	1.7	2.2	1.7	1.3	1.9
Unemployme	nt (per cent)						
1960-73	2.9	2.6	4.8	1.2	1.0	2.6	5.7	3.3
1973-79	5.0	4.6	6.7	1.9	3.0	4.4	6.0	4.9
1979-89	7.3	9.4	7.3	2.5	5.8	8.8	8.2	9.8
1989-99	7.4	9.9	5.8	3.1	7.5	11.2	10.9	8.3
Inflation (per	cent per an	num)						
1960-73	3.9	4.1	3.1	6.1	3.4	4.9	4.9	4.8
1973-79	8.8	9.6	7.8	9.5	4.6	11.1	16.7	15.6
1979-89	5.4	6.6	5.3	2.5	2.8	7.5	11.4	7.0
1989-99	2.7	3.4	2.4	1.0	2.4	2.1	4.6	3.8
Investment S	hare (per ce	ent)						
1960-73	21.9	26.5	15.3	29.5	31.1	26.9	28.7	18.8
1973-79	22.7	25.0	16.6	32.0	27.2	26.8	24.5	18.5
1979-89	21.5	22.2	17.0	29.9	24.8	23.2	21.7	17.1
1989-99	22.3	22.5	17.5	32.4	24.2	22.9	20.7	18.4

Source: OECD.

productivity growth in the business sector

	TFP Grov	wth		Labour Productivity Growth			
	1960-73	1973-79	1979-97	1960-73	1973-79	1979-97	
OECD	2.9	0.6	0.9	4.6	1.7	1.7	
EU	3.4	1.2	1.1	5.4	2.5	1.8	
USA	1.9	0.1	0.7	2.6	0.3	2.2	
Japan	4.9	0.7	0.9	8.4	2.8	2.3	
Germany	2.6	1.8	1.2	4.5	3.1	2.2	
France	3.7	1.6	1.3	5.3	2.9	2.2	
Italy	4.4	2.0	1.1	6.4	2.8	2.0	
UK	2.6	0.5	1.1	4.1	1.6	2.0	

Source: Economics of the OECD 2000 exam paper data table 2.


the growth slowdown in the 1970s


- Mis-measurement
 - The single-deflation bias;
 - Increasing importance of service sector.
- Demand-side
 - Mistaken belief in long-run tradeoff between unemployment and inflation led to serious policy errors after the oil shock and collapse of Bretton Woods in 1971-3.
- Supply-side
 - Slowing labour supply growth;
 - Exhaustion of catch-up gains;
 - The First Oil Shock, October 1973;
 - The rise in Union militancy, 1969-75.

identifiable forces 1973-1987


	France	Germany	/ Japan	Netherlands	UK	USA
GDP	-2.88	-4.12	-5.54	-2.96	-1.28	-1.14
Augmented factor input	-0.78	-1.63	-2.49	-1.02	-0.83	0.01
TFP	-2.10	-2.49	-3.05	-1.94	-0.45	-1.15
Structural Effect	-0.56	-0.23	-1.07	-0.25	-0.48	-0.23
Technology Diffusion	-0.01	-0.19	-0.29	-0.10	0.06	0.00
Foreign Trade	-0.10	-0.16	-0.20	-0.65	-0.05	0.00
Scale Effect	-0.09	-0.13	-0.17	-0.09	-0.04	-0.03
Energy Effect	-0.05	-0.03	-0.12	-0.31	-0.05	-0.19
Natural Resources	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.19	0.14	0.00
Total explained	-0.95	-1.02	-2.21	-1.40	-0.17	-0.34
Residual TFP	-1.15	-1.47	-0.84	-0.54	-0.28	-0.81


Note: Data are differences between annual compound growth rates over 1950-73 and 1973-87. Source: Maddison (1991) table 5.19.





an 'oil price shock' & labour





rate of growth of energy inputs, 1913-87

	1913-1950	1950-1973	1973-1987
France	0.40	4.50	0.87
Germany	0.00	4.63	0.19
Japan	1.98	9.19	0.79
Netherlands	1.64	6.71	0.96
UK	0.01	1.46	-0.34
USA	1.87	3.13	0.90
Arithmetic Average	0.98	4.94	0.48

Note: Source: Data are annual compound grov Maddison (1991) table 5.11.

the single-deflation bias

- Consider real GDP calculated as: VASDi=GOi/PPOi-Mi/PPOi
- Where PPO is the gross output deflator, GO is gross output, M is intermediate inputs and VASD is single-deflated value-added. However, real value-added should really be double-deflated: VADDi=GOi/PPOi-Mi/PPIi
- Where PPI is the intermediate input price deflator. VADD differ from VASD when PPO differs from PPI: Bias=VASD-VADD=f(PPO/PPI)
- A positive oil shock raises the ratio of PPI to PPO and hence makes VASD growth understate the growth of VADD. A fall in oil prices does the opposite.

energy price rises and investment


- As we have seen, a rise in energy prices leads to a rise in unemployment in both the NRU and the NAIRU models (unless fully accommodated by trade unions).
- Profitability of installed capital stock fell when energy prices rose in 1973. This should reduce investment, especially when most finance is internal to the firm.
- Much of the installed capital stock was designed for low energy prices and hence became obsolete. This should lead to capital scrapping.
- The profitability of the marginal investment should have risen due to factor substitution away from expensive energy (and labour).
- Difficult to say which effect dominates! But perhaps the wage bargaining process matters too.

the 'Golden Age' institutional equilibrium

- Imagine a social contract between labour and firms: that neither side will try to raise wages or prices unexpectedly and that firms will reinvest profits rather than raise dividends. That is, labour and capital shares in income are stable by social consensus.
- Unions set real wages and firms choose investment levels simultaneously. However, it takes one period for a change in investment level to take effect.
- This is essentially a coordination game with two plausible equilibria:
 - 'Wage Restraint; High Investment'
 - 'Wage Push; Low Investment'
- Tipping from the 'good' to the 'bad' equilibrium is more likely when firm and union discount factors fall, productivity falls, or union aggressiveness rises.

why did the equilibrium shift?

- The incentive to for the equilibrium to switch will be high, when:
 - Inflation is expected to be volatile and potential economic growth is slower;
 - There is a movement towards a floating exchange-rate;
 - Wage-setting becomes decentralised or disorganised; Corporatist institutions are 'captured' by one side, either unions or firms; or union legislation changes;
 - A rise in international capital mobility;
 - A rise in employment protection;
 - Financial liberalisation allows easy access to credit;
 - Increased competition on world markets;
 - There is a negative productivity shock, such as an oil shock.



unionisation and strike rates

	Degree of Unionization				Strike Rates		
	1960	1970	1975	1979	1960-67	1968-75	
Canada	0.25	0.27	0.31	0.33 ^a	0.35	0.82	
Denmark	0.47	0.51	0.5	0.69	NA	NA	
Germany	0.30	0.30	0.35	0.37	0.01	0.03	
Japan	0.17	0.23	0.24	0.23	0.09	0.10	
Sweden	0.53	0.66	0.75	0.80	NA	NA	
UK	0.42	0.46	0.50	0.54	0.12	0.45	
USA	0.26	0.25	0.23	0.21 ^a	0.33	0.53	

Source: Bruno and Sachs (1985) pp. 169 table 8.13.

Notes: Degree of unionization is union membership per total employed workers. The strike rate is workdays lost due to strikes per total employed. a: 1978.

manufacturing labour share of value added

	1961	1969	1973	1975	1979	1981
Belgium	58.3	60.6	67.9	77.0	75.7	76.9
Canada	67.3	68.5	65.8	69.2	65.8	NA
Denmark	68.6	72.2	74.8	74.5	76.5	74.5
France	65.9	65.8	68. 7	74.1	74.6	75.9
Germany	52.6	52.6	58.8	60.5	59.2	63.3
Japan	39.6	40.3	44.5	53.8	49.8	NA
UK	69.9	71.0	71.4	80.2	79.7	82.8
USA	70.5	71.0	71.6	71.6	73.8	75.6

Source: Bruno and Sachs (1985) table 8.8.

the decline in labour reallocation?

- Maddison (1991) calculates the effect of lower labour reallocation on growth rates, as does Temple (2001).
- In the 1950s, reallocation particularly important for Italy, West Germany and France. After 1960, Italy and Spain continue to benefit. However, of the 1970s slowdown, only around one-seventh can be attributed to lower reallocation.
- But note that these effects do not include the possibility of increasing returns in the non-agricultural sectors (Kaldor, 1966) or explain which factors allowed labour to move at such rates in the 1950s and 1960s.

	France	Germany 、	Japan	Netherlands	UK	USA
Maddison Structural	0.27	0.09 (0.35	0.13	1.07	0.20
Temple Structural	0.12	0.08		0.04	0.03	0.13

Notes: Proportional contributions to the slowdown by lower labour reallocation. Maddison calculates the effect of lower reallocation on growth in 1973-87 vs 195-73. Temple calculates the effect of lower reallocation on growth in 1979-90 vs 1960-73.

UK manufacturing TFP growth

- In common with most other OECD economies, UK manufacturing Total Factor Productivity growth slowed in the 1970s (from about 2½ per cent per annum in the 1960s to about 0.2 per cent per annum between 1973 and 1979).
- The UK manufacturing TFP experienced an increase in growth in the 1980s, attaining a growth rate of about 3 per cent per annum.
- Two possible explanations for the slowdown and speedup:
 - Mis-measurement: Capital Scrapping; Labour Hoarding; Single Deflation Bias.
 - Structural Change: Institutional Rigidities and Strong Unions in the 1970s followed in the 1980s by weakening of trade union power, withdrawal of state-subsidies, shedding of below average plants, increased subcontracting and catch-up to international best practice.

UK manufacturing growth

	1960q1-73q1	1973q1-79q2	1979q2-90q2	1990q2-95q3	1960q1-95q3
Decompositio	n of Y/L				
Y/L	4.20%	1.50%	4.62%	3.46%	3.75%
TFP	2.58%	0.15%	3.03%	2.20%	2.23%
K/L	1.62%	1.35%	1.59%	1.26%	1.51%
Decompositio	n of TFP				
TFP	2.58%	0.15%	3.03%	2.20%	2.23%
Biases	0.12%	-1.16%	0.33%	0.50%	0.02%
Cycle	-0.81%	0.11%	-0.11%	0.03%	-0.31%
Trends	3.04%	1.88%	2.75%	2.56%	2.67%
Other*	0.23%	-0.67%	-0.06%	-0.88%	-0.15%
Decompositio	n of Trends				
Trends	3.04%	1.88%	2.75%	2.56%	2.67%
SKILL	0.52%	0.34%	0.29%	0.22%	0.37%
UNION	-0.11%	-0.06%	0.25%	0.06%	0.04%
R&D	0.92%	-0.11%	0.50%	0.55%	0.55%
Other ⁺	1.72%	1.72%	1.72%	1.72%	1.72%

Notes:

May not sum exactly due to rounding. These estimates are based on the parameters in regression (1). SKILL is the ratio of administrative, technical and derical staff to total workers. UNION is the proportion of full-time manual males covered by collective agreements. R & D is the ratio of the stock of industry-funded Business Enterprise spending on R & D (BERD) to the physical capital stock. % change in labour productivity = % change in TFP + % change in the contribution of the capital to labour ratio.

* Includes the residual plus seasonal factors.

+ This is the effect of the base trend.

Levine-Renelt on European growth

	1923-38	1950-73	1973-89
Constant	2.01	2.01	2.01
Initial GDP per head	-2.43	-2.49	-3.55
Investment/GDP	1.42	2.22	2.06
Secondary Enrolment	0.16	0.68	0.79
Primary Enrolment	1.9	1.99	1.79
Government/GDP	-0.62	-0.87	-1.27
Forecast	2.44	3.54	1.83
Actual	2.12	3.84	2.14
Residual	-0.32	0.3	0.31

Note: Source: Data are annual compound growth rates. Crafts and Toniolo (1996) table 1.11.

summary

- Growth slowed dramatically in the early 1970s. Underlying productivity performance also collapsed. There was some recovery in the 1980s and 1990s, but overall performance is still mixed.
- It is probably best to view the 'Golden Age' is a unique period where catch-up, reconstruction, and liberalisation all promoted rapid growth.
- But when catch-up gains began to run out and the macroeconomic shocks of the early 1970s appeared, there was a rapid slowdown as the high-investment, wage & price restraint commitment of the 'Golden Age' collapsed.
- Even after the macroeconomic shocks of the early 1970s had faded, growth did not return to its 'Golden Age' rate.
- Analysis is complicated by the mis-measurement in the data.

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