template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
title: Dynamic Pollution Games.
author-name: Mason, R
keywords: POLLUTION ; ECONOMETRICS
length: 25 pages
abstract: This paper extends and challenges Maler and de Zeeuw's (1996) acid rain linear-quadratic differential game.
classification-jel: Q28 C7
creation-date: 1997
handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:129

template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
title: Adaptive Dynamics with Payoff Heterogeneity.
author-name: Myatt, D-P
author-name: Wallace, C
keywords: ECONOMETRICS
length: 42 pages
abstract: A finite population of agents playing a 2 x 2 summetric game evolves vy adaptive best response. The assumption that players make mistakes is dropped in favour of one where players differ, via payoff heterogeneity.
classification-jel: C7
creation-date: 1997
handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:130

template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
title: Asymptotic Results for Cointegration Tests in Non-Stable Cases.
author-name: Nielsen, B
keywords: STATISTICS ; MATHEMATICS ; ECONOMETRICS
length: 33 pages
abstract: Asymptotic analyses of unit root tests in autoregressive time series are usually based on the assumptions that the number of unit roots is known and that the remaining characteristic roots are stable. The last assumption seems not to be necessary. This is stated more precisely for two examples.
classification-jel: C1
creation-date: 1997
handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:131

template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
title: Almost Common Value Auctions: The "Wallet Game" and its Applications to Takeover Battles and Airwaves Auctions.
author-name: Klemperer, P.
keywords: PURCHASING ; TAKEOVERS ; TELECOMMUNICATIONS
length: 16 pages
abstract: We use a classroom game, the "wallet Game", to show that in standard ascending, i.e. English, auctions of close-to-common-values objects, even slight asymmetries between bidders can have very large effects on prices. Examples of small asymmetries are a small value advantage for one bidder or a small ownership of the object by one bidder; the effects of these asymmetries are greatly exarcabated by entry costs or bidding costs. We discuss applications to Airwaves Auctions and Takeover Battles including the Glaxo-Wellcome Merger.
classification-jel: D44 G34 L96
creation-date: 1997
handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:134

template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
title: A Ratioanl Learning Model of Gender Segregation in Labour Markets.
author-name: Breen, R.
author-name: Garcia-Penalosa, C.
keywords: LABOUR ECONOMICS ; DEMOGRAPHY
length: 44 pages
abstract: In indusrialized countries, men and women tend to work in different occupations. Particularly striking is the degree to which gender segregation has persisted despite changes in legislation, employers' attitudes and preferences. This paper presents a possible explanation of such persistence when agentshave imperfect information about their probability of success in different occupations.
classification-jel: J16 J24
creation-date: 1997
handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:135

template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
title: Equilibrium Departures From Common Knowledge in Games With Non-Additive Expected Utility.
author-name: Mukerji, S.
author-name: Song Shin, H.
keywords: GAME THEORY
length: 24 pages
abstract: In a game where the players have non-additive beliefs, we explore the beliefs implicit in the equilibrium behaviour of the players. Under one interpretation, we can show that there are well-defined departures from common knowledge of the game among the players. Our argument revolves around a representation theorem which relates equilibrium under under non-additive beliefs to equilibrium actions of a set of types in a Bayesian game with a common prior. Among these types, the game is common p-belief, where the 'p' depends on the degree of uncertainty aversion. Only when the beliefs are additive is p=1.
classification-jel: C72 C79 D80 D81
creation-date: 1997
handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:137

template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
title: Informational Herding and Optimal Experimentation
author-name: Smith, L.
author-name: Sorensen, P.
keywords: LEARNING ; INFORMATION ; EXPERIMENTATION
length: 24 pages
abstract: We explore the constrained efficient observational learning model - as when individuals care about successors, or are so induced by an informationlly-constrained social planner. We find that when the herding externality is correctly internalized in this fashion, incorrect herds still obtain. To describe behaviour in this model, we exhibit a set of indices that capture the privately extimated social value of every action.
classification-jel: C90 D83
creation-date: 1997
handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:139

template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
title: Dynamic Comparative Advantage and the Welfare Effects of Trade
author-name: Redding, S.
keywords: ECONOMIC GROWTH ; LEARNING ; INTERNATIONAL TRADE ; PRODUCTIVITY
length: 35 pages
abstract: This paper argues that developing economies may face a trade-off between specializaing according to existing comparative advantage (in low-technology goods), and entering sectors in which they currently lack a comparative advantage, but may acquire such an advantage in the future as a result of the potential for productivity growth (in high-technology goods). Comparative advantage is endogenously determined by past technological change, while simultaneously shaping current rates of innovation.
classification-jel: F10 F43 O41
creation-date: 1997
handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:140