Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Christopher J. Tyson
Author-Email: christopher.tyson@nuffield.ox.ac.uk
Author-Workplace-Name: Nuffield College, Oxford University, UK
Title: Iterative Dominance and Sequential Bargaining
Abstract: A new game theoretic analysis of finite horizon, complete information bargaining 
is advanced. The extensive form reflects an attempt to model unstructured 
negotiations, in which the negotiants can gain no artificial advantage from the
details of the bargaining protocol. Conditions are identified under which the game
is dominance solvable in the sense that iterative deletion of weakly dominated 
strategies selects a unique outcome. These conditions serve to preclude embedded
static bargaining problems of the sort that have historically been deemed 
indeterminate, thereby ensuring that the dynamic problems analyzed will be 
resolvable without imposing any particular static theory.
Classification-JEL: C78, D71, D74
Keywords: coalition, core, iterative dominance, temporal monopoly
Length: 20 pages
Creation-Date:2004-08-27
Number:2004-W23
File-URL: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/papers/2004/w23/270804.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:0423