Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Aytek Erdil 
Author-Email: aytek.erdil@nuffield.ox.ac.uk
Author-Workplace-Name: Dept of Economics, University of Oxford, Oxford 
Author-Name: Paul Klemperer
Author-Email: paul.klemperer@economics.ox.ac.uk.
Author-Workplace-Name: Dept of Economics, University of Oxford, Oxford 
Title: A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions
Abstract: We propose a new, easy-to-implement, class of payment rules, “Reference
Rules,” to make core-selecting package auctions more robust. Small, almost riskless,
profitable deviations from “truthful bidding” are often easy for bidders to find under 
currently-used payment rules. Reference Rules perform better than existing rules on 
our marginal-incentive-to-deviate criterion, and are as robust as existing rules to large 
deviations. Other considerations, including fairness and comprehensibility, also support
the use of Reference Rules.
Keywords: multi-object auction, core, combinatorial auction, package auction, core-selecting 
auction, Vickrey auction, Vickrey, simultaneous ascending auction, robust design. 
Classification-JEL: D44, C71
Length: 16 pages
Creation-Date: 2009-09-01
Number: 2009-W11
File-URL: http://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/economics/papers/2009/w11/cspa-23-9-2009.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:0911