Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: David Ronayne
Author-Workplace-Name: Economics Dept. and Nuffield College, University of Oxford
Author-Email: david.ronayne@economics.ox.ac.uk
Author-Name: Daniel Sgroi
Author-Workplace-Name: Economics Dept. and CAGE, University of Warwick and Nuffield College, University of Oxford
Author-Email: daniel.sgroi@warwick.ac.uk
Title: When Good Advice is Ignored: The Role of Envy and Stubbornness
Abstract: We present results from an experiment involving 1,500 participants on whether, when and why good advice is ignored, focusing on envy and stubbornness. Participants performance in skill-based and luck-based tasks generated a probability of
winning a bonus. About a quarter ignored advice that would have increased their chance of winning. Good advice was followed less often when the adviser was relatively highly remunerated or the task was skill-based. More envious advisees took
good advice more often in the skill-based task, but higher adviser remuneration significantly reduced this effect. Susceptibility to the sunk cost fallacy reduced the uptake of good advice 
Classification-JEL:  C91, C99, D91
Keywords: advice, skill, remuneration, envy, sunk cost fallacy
Length: 47 pages
Creation-Date: 2018-01-17
Number: 2018-W01
File-URL: https://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/economics/Papers/2018/wp-170118.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:1801