Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Simon Finster
Author-Workplace-Name: Nuffield College and Department of Economics, University of Oxford 
Author-Email: simon.finster@nuffield.ox.ac.uk
Title: Strategic Bidding in Product-Mix, Sequential, and Simultaneous Auctions
Abstract: We study equilibria in Product-Mix, sequential, and simultaneous auctions, which are used to sell differentiated, indivisible goods. A flexible bidder with unit demand, interested in buying
any of the goods, competes against several inflexible bidders, each interested in only one specific good. For first-price and second-price payments, we obtain theoretical results on equilibrium
bidding, and compare efficiency, revenue, and bidder surplus numerically. Differences in outcomes between Product-Mix and sequential auctions are small for a range of value distributions.
The simultaneous auction performs worst in all dimensions, and differences in performance vary substantially with the degree of competition the flexible bidder faces.
Classification-JEL: C72, D44, D47, D61, D82
Keywords: multi-unit auctions, asymmetric auctions, market power, menu auctions, sequential auctions, simultaneous auctions
Length: 59 pages
Creation-Date: 2020-03-24
Number: 2020-W03
File-URL: https://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/economics/Papers/2020/2020W03_pma_strategic_5.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:2003