Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Ken Binmore 
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Author-Workplace-Name:Dept of Economics, University College London
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Author-Name: Paul Klemperer
Author-Email: paul.klemperer@economics.ox.ac.uk
Author-Homepage: http://www.paulklemperer.org
Author-Workplace-Name:Nuffield College, Oxford University
Author-Workplace-Homepage:http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/nuffield.html
Title:The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licenses
Abstract:
  This paper reviews the part played by economists in organizing the British
  third-generation mobile-phone licence auction that concluded on 27 April 2000. It
  raised £22 1/2 billion ($34 billion or 2 1/2% of GNP) and was widely described at the
  time as the biggest auction ever.
  We discuss the merits of auctions versus "beauty contests", the aims of the auction,
  the problems we faced, the auction designs we considered, and the mistakes that were made.
Classification-JEL:D44, L96
Keywords: Auctions, Telecommunications, Spectrum Auctions, Mobile Phones, 3G, UMTS, Bidding.
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Length:33 pages
Creation-Date: 2001-02-01
Revision-Date: 2001-09-01   
Number:2002-W4
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File-URL:http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/papers/2002/w4/biggest29nov.pdf
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Handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:0204