Abstract

This paper critiques the prevailing understanding of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a norm-governed regional body by critically examining the norm of non-interference, which is universally regarded as the centre-piece of the so-called ‘ASEAN way’ of regionalism, even by scholars and commentators who are profoundly opposed to it. This overwhelming consensus fares very badly when confronted with empirical evidence to the contrary, which shows that ASEAN states have frequently meddled in the internal affairs of other countries. The paper considers and rejects constructivist and realist explanations of intervention and advances a more coherent logic based on the insights of historical materialism. The paper’s basic argument is that ASEAN states’ fundamental purpose during the Cold War, reflecting the social forces in control of them, was to maintain non-communist social orders. To the extent that non-interference served this purpose, it was respected; but when it did not, it was discarded or twisted to serve the cause of disguising blatant intervention.
ASEAN and the Norm of Non-Interference in Southeast Asia: A Quest for Social Order

ASEAN countries’ consistent adherence to this principle of non-interference is the key reason why no military conflict has broken out between any two ASEAN countries since the founding of ASEAN… Let us maintain it in the twenty-first century.


Frankly, we have been interfering mercilessly in each other’s internal affairs for ages, from the very beginning.

- Bilahari Kausikan, Second Permanent Secretary, Singaporean Foreign Ministry

1. Introduction

Although its reputation has taken a beating since the Asian financial crisis (1997-98), in the years following the end of the Cold War, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was widely regarded as the world’s most successful third-world regional institution, and as a model for wider cooperation. In a context where regional policymakers were announcing an ‘Asian renaissance’ and aggressively promoting ‘Asian values’ as a superior, contextualised alternative to the West’s liberal triumphalism, analysts heralded the ‘Pacific century’ and singled out ASEAN in particular as offering a better route to cooperation than Western ‘legalism’. This route was the so-called ‘ASEAN way’ to regionalism, supposedly a bundle of norms that had created peace and stability in Southeast Asia which included traditions of consultation and consensus-building and, in particular, the norm of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. The internalisation of these norms by elites had, argued the constructivist scholars who dominate the study of the region, socialised them into new patterns of behaviour, creating a unique ‘diplomatic and security culture’ and even a ‘security community’. In the strategic uncertainty of the post-

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2 Interview, Singapore, February 2008.
Cold War period, ASEAN projected these norms outwards to form the ASEAN Regional Forum, the first and only Asia-Pacific security institution, where ASEAN retains the ‘driver’s seat’ to this day.7

In retrospect, many of these assessments look rather outdated, part of that exuberant post-Cold War period where scholars, activists and policymakers heralded a ‘new world order’ that would be governed by norms, law and institutions in contrast to the power, interests and brute force of the preceding decades. After the Asian financial crisis, which crippled the region’s economies, fomented domestic social conflict and intra-regional bickering and exposed ASEAN’s institutional capacity as decidedly weak, more negative assessments were forthcoming.8 Yet one oddity is the survival of the focus on ‘norms’. Acharya’s Constructing a Security Community and Haacke’s Diplomatic and Security Culture were both published well after the crisis, and constructivist approaches continue to dominate in the region.9 Indeed, by 2005, Acharya was able to ask, apparently seriously, whether anyone was still not a constructivist.10

One illustration of this is the virtually uncontested approach to the ‘norm’ held up as central to the ‘ASEAN way’ – non-interference. Almost every scholar writing on ASEAN takes it for granted that ASEAN states adhere almost religiously to this norm. This tendency has a long legacy that predates the constructivist domination that has enshrined it as accepted truth. Michael Leifer, the doyen of the realist school of ASEAN studies, described non-interference as a ‘cherished principle’ that was broken only twice in ASEAN’s history: once in 1986 when ASEAN called for the peaceful resolution of political upheaval in the Philippines, and once in 1997 when ASEAN set entrance conditions for Cambodia following a coup there.11 Leifer argued that ASEAN’s international prominence was built on its long confrontation of Vietnam following its 1978 invasion of Cambodia, and thus on upholding ‘the sanctity of sovereignty’.12 His contemporary defenders, even while denouncing the general claims of constructivism, do so by claiming that ‘the only “institutional principle” to which ASEAN adheres is that of non-interference’.13

Mainstream realists are not alone in echoing the accepted wisdom on non-interference, however. ‘Subaltern’ realism, makes very similar general claims, arguing that all developing countries have embraced ‘rigidly demarcated and sacrosanct boundaries, mutual recognition of sovereign political entities, and non-

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intervention in the affairs of other states… third-world elites have internalised these values to an astonishing degree’. This is reflected in International Society approaches towards ASEAN that draw on subaltern realism and consequently argue that member-states have only broken ASEAN principles in defence of their own sovereignty.15

There is general agreement that despite some ‘intra-mural challenges’ to the norm, non-interference has been ‘maintained’, with disastrous results. Non-interference is blamed for ‘arresting’ regionalism, by making ASEAN unable to confront important issues like the military regime in Myanmar, the humanitarian crisis in East Timor, and transnational problems like piracy and environmental degradation. Yet non-interference supposedly remains absolute, despite dire warnings that ‘either interference becomes legitimate, or the Association will become increasingly meaningless. The ASEAN Way ends here’. Thus, even scholars who profoundly disagree with the norm of non-interference and call for its revision are nonetheless convinced of its continuing capacity to bind the conduct of ASEAN member-states.

The problem with this assessment is that it fares quite poorly when confronted with empirical reality. ASEAN’s own former secretary-general, Rodolfo Severino, insists that non-interference is not a doctrine that is adhered to and applied on dogmatic or ideological grounds. It springs from a practical need to prevent external pressure from being exerted against the perceived national interest – or the interest of the regime. Essentially arising from pragmatic considerations, ASEAN’s practice of non-interference has not been absolute.

To the contrary, admits one senior Singaporean diplomat, ‘we have been interfering mercilessly in each other’s internal affairs for ages, from the very beginning’. What sort of interference has taken place? This paper focuses on major violations of the norm during the Cold War. During this period, Thailand sponsored various insurgencies within the neighbouring state of Burma. In 1975, Indonesia annexed the Democratic Republic of East Timor, which ASEAN endorsed and sought to justify at the United Nations and elsewhere. After the Vietnamese overthrew Pol Pot in 1978, ASEAN entered into de facto alliance with China, helping to rebuild Khmer Rouge

20 Rodolfo C. Severino, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the Former ASEAN Secretary-General (Singapore: ISEAS, 2006), 94.
21 Interview with Bilahari Kausikan, Singapore, February 2008.
remnants on Thai soil to keep the Cambodian civil war running, cobbled together and helped arm a coalition government-in-exile and lobbied at the UN for it to retain Cambodia’s seat and receive international aid. ASEAN then initiated peace plans that eventually brought an unprecedented UN state-building mission to Cambodia to help displace the incumbent regime.

This paper explores different theoretical approaches that might help us explain the puzzle of how an organisation famed for its adherence to non-interference has actually engaged in acts of intervention. Constructivism and realism will be critiqued in favour of a historical materialist approach that takes into account social forces and political action and is firmly grounded in empirical reality. The paper then briefly goes on to show how such an approach can help explain the patterns of non-interference and intervention in Southeast Asia, limiting its analysis to the Cold War period due to limitations of space. Although this is just a study of one particular norm in a specific part of the world, the insights generated by this approach may mean that it has merit for understanding normative regimes in other regions, or more globally, particularly since non-intervention (or its correlate, respect for the sovereignty of states) is generally acknowledged to be one of the foundational norms of international society.

2. Contending Theoretical Approaches to Norms and Non-Interference

The definition of intervention/ interference adopted in this paper is a broad one: ‘activity undertaken by a state, a group within a state or an international organisation which interferes in the domestic affairs of another state’.22 This is partly in order to retain the critical function of scholarship, the capacity to identify as intervention any act deliberately aimed at altering political outcomes in a political community outside one’s own, regardless of what policymakers may call it and regardless of whether military force is used. It is also partly because ASEAN policymakers themselves have defined interference very broadly. Indonesia’s 1982 call for Malaysian-Philippine talks over disputed territory in Borneo resulted in the expulsion of the Indonesian ambassador from Manila for two years for ‘undue interference’.23 More recently, Singapore’s Senior Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, was denounced for having ‘intervened in other people’s affairs’ by commenting on Indonesia’s lax approach to terrorism.24 It is worth judging statesmen by the standards they set for others. In this section I briefly outline three different ways of approaching the issue of intervention.

2.1 Constructivism

Although, as I have suggested above, constructivists’ focus on norms has blinded them to the reality of empirical evidence of intervention, different constructivists also attempt to offer a normative explanation of intervention, using similar theoretical approaches. Martha Finnemore argues that changing patterns of intervention since the eighteenth century reflect developing shared beliefs about the legitimacy of the

use of force. ‘What is interesting’, she argues, ‘… is not the claim that intervention serves interests; of greater note are the contentions about what state interests are and which interests intervention serves’. Finnemore argues that these ‘interests and incentives have been constituted socially through state practices and the evolution of shared norms through which states act’, which is a bold claim for the primacy of ‘norms’ over material interests. States have ‘understandings’ of the mechanisms of international order and ‘notions… about the kinds of domestic rule conducive to international stability’, which change over time. As these ‘shared understandings’ evolve, so the ‘purpose of intervention’ changes.

There are all sorts of problems packed into these arguments; here I simply want to highlight one. On the one hand, what seems to be driving this analysis is a claim that that ‘states’ have ideas about the relationship between different sorts of domestic order and international order: some varieties of the former may be destabilising; others, conducive to harmony. In the nineteenth-century European Concert period, for instance, Finnemore rightly notes that the Holy Alliance saw liberal revolutions as ‘the premier threat in international politics’ and intervened to suppress them. This, one might reasonably think, ought to direct our attention to the social and political conflict that generates different social orders and to asking why states seek to manage social order in the name of international tranquillity. But Finnemore chooses instead to focus on ‘shared understandings’ at the international level, between states as entities that are apparently sufficiently unitary to possess ‘understandings’ and ‘notions’ of their own. Indeed, despite noting that the ‘social purpose’ of states may vary, e.g., fascist and communist states’ behaviour may differ from that of liberal democracies, she skirts quickly past the possibility of a ‘domestic locus of causation’, because ‘variation may also come from changes in the social rules constructed among states in their dealings with one another’. By focusing on shared norms that supposedly guide interventions, Finnemore evacuates from her analysis the social conflict and power relations that establish particular orders, generate norms, and influence their development and usage. The implicit assumption that states principally seek international stability reinforces her emphasis on harmony and consensus rather than on conflict and contestation, reinforced by selection bias in her empirical material, such as her avoidance of the 1914-45 period as one with ‘no clear order’, rather than interrogating why this might be.

Furthermore, despite Finnemore’s repeated use of the word ‘social’ and constructivism’s general claim to offer a ‘social theory’ of international politics, Finnemore is ultimately (like Wendt) an idealist methodological individualist. Her explanations of how norms change focus on ‘affective mechanisms’: ‘liking’ and ‘empathy’ create ‘purposes for social action’, without which we have no reason to act, producing a ‘we-feeling’ that NGOs can manipulate; social influence followed by internalisation, coupled with ‘shaming’ and ‘rewarding’ ‘gradually changes people’s

26 Ibid., 83.
27 Ibid., 86-87.
28 Ibid., 146-149.
29 Ibid., 94.
30 Ibid., 95.
views’. Thus, it is ultimately *emotions* arising from *personal interaction* that create our reasons for acting (i.e., our ideas or feelings that constitute our interests) and change the way we behave. How we then get from the level of individuals to the level of states is unclear: the realm of the social, of *conflict* between individuals, groups and classes, is Finnemore’s ‘black box’. By reconstituting international relations theory as psychobabble, Finnemore posits a highly voluntarist notion of order, which simply emerges and is not imposed. However, as Weber pointed out, ‘an order is always “imposed” to the extent that it does not originate from a voluntary personal agreement of all the individuals concerned’. The only role that coercion plays in Finnemore’s account is where a state intervenes to change the ‘social purpose’ of a target state to one that is in line with the ‘shared understandings’ then prevailing. This, first, assumes that the intervening state already shares the prevailing norm and thus fails to offer an explanation of how the norm was established in the first place; and, second, contradicts its own emphasis on ‘shared understandings’ by implicitly recognising the existence of at least one state (the unhappy target of this intervention) that somehow does not ‘share’ in this ‘understanding’ of what its ‘social purpose’ really ought to be.

Constructivism, then, does not prove helpful in understanding why interventions occur. Despite an initially promising idea that states may use intervention to manage social order, constructivism directs our gaze away from such conflictual, political questions towards what is shared and consensual, and when are try to grasp at why norms are shared and consensual, the explanation runs through our fingers until we are left grasping the minutest unit of analysis – the individual human being. Moreover, when applied specifically to ASEAN, such an approach would merely replicate the blindness of the existing literature: the norm that is supposed to be ‘shared’ among ASEAN states is that of non-interference; it is difficult to proceed from this to explaining acts of intervention.

### 2.2 Realism

Realism would offer a relatively simple answer to the puzzle identified above: ASEAN states intervened because it was in their interests to do so. In general, realism tends to view norms, law and institutions generally either as direct expressions of the prevailing balance of power, or as a cloak of legitimacy, artfully draped across the shoulders of arbitrary power. States are motivated not by ‘norms’ but by self-interest, ranging from security at a bare minimum to a drive for universal hegemony at a maximum. However, as Legro and Moravcsik point out, this range is so wide that it encompasses any behaviour except self-destruction and is thus useless to understanding what state interests actually are, robbing ‘theory of the determinate and predictive character that seemed to give the pure power hypothesis its particular value’. Indeed, so indeterminate is the realist account of interests that
is has rightly been branded a ‘degenerating research paradigm’, generating so many different outcomes that the theory becomes impossible to falsify.38

Realists have thus been forced to abandon the parsimonious, system-level model developed by Waltz and open up the ‘black box’ of the state in order to locate the source of state interests. One such attempt is Stephen Krasner’s Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. Like constructivists, he counterposes the ‘logic of consequences’, which ‘see political action and outcomes, including institutions, as the product of rational calculating behaviour designed to maximise a given set of unexplained preferences’, to ‘logics of appropriateness’ which ‘understand political action as a product of rules, roles, and identities that stipulate appropriate behaviour in given situations’,39 but conversely argues, using dozens of examples, that repeated violations of international legal and Westphalian sovereignty illustrate that ‘a logic of consequences can always prevail over a logic of appropriateness’.40 Sovereignty is thus ‘organised hypocrisy’, respected or ignored based only on which course yields for rulers the most ‘resources (both material and ideational)’.41 Krasner argues, ‘rulers want to stay in power and, being in power, they want to promote the security, prosperity and values of their constituents’.42 Rulers make ‘calculations of material and ideational interests’, and will intervene wherever this serves the goal of ‘promoting’ the interests of their ‘constituents’.43

However, it is obvious that ‘interests’ and ‘values’ are objects subject to fundamental contestation in any society. No state can simultaneously ‘promote’ the interests of all of their ‘constituents’, and moreover no ruler actually needs to do so in order to ‘stay in power’. Krasner’s theory thus runs into difficulty for the same reason as Finnemore’s: it lacks a social theory to tell us exactly which interests and values ‘rulers’ will ‘promote’. Ironically, Krasner’s ‘critical realism’ and Finnemore’s constructivism repeat in their own way the principal failure of neorealism by positing ‘the state as a completed social order such that its foreign interests are constituted entirely internationally – thereby removing interpretation of the “national interest” from domestic political consideration’.44

Consider, for instance, Krasner’s explanation of why governments sign human rights treaties: to constrain future governments; to ‘follow the script of modernity’; and to attract support in other countries.45 At best, only the first suggestion has anything to do with domestic politics, but no reference is made to ideology or social relations to explain why a government should wish to bind its successors. Furthermore, following the ‘script of modernity’ is surely a ‘logic of appropriateness’. This reflects the book’s overall indeterminacy, since although the sheer bulk of empirical evidence is meant to bludgeon the reader into agreeing that

40 Ibid., 69.
41 Ibid., 24.
42 Ibid., 7.
43 Ibid., 9.
45 Krasner, Sovereignty, 21.
norms of ‘sovereignty have always been violated’, elsewhere Krasner’s claims must be stated far more modestly – ‘logics of consequences can trump logics of appropriateness’ – an unobjectionable, rather obvious point. The arguably false dichotomy Krasner operates with (consequences vs. appropriateness) ultimately leaves him open to arguments that the ‘logic of appropriateness structures the logic of consequences’, which ultimately leads us back, full circle, to the constructivist claim about the primacy of norms in constituting interests, and all the questions this begs.

2.3 Historical Materialism

Arguably, the problems with realist and constructivist theory reflect a general problem with International Relations theory: they reify the state, and then enquire as to its behaviour. Sooner or later, this approach necessarily runs into problems: Finnemore falls back on individualism, voluntarism and psychological theory, and Krasner on vague ‘constituents’ whose interests are promoted, because neither wish to confront the fact that the state does not exist a priori to be ‘socialised’ or to promote ‘unexplained preferences’ but is itself the product of contending social forces which ‘reflects and essentially underpins the prevailing hierarchies of power embodied in the social order’. States are also the political arena in which this struggle is played out. International relations are ultimately derivative of these struggles, as Gramsci argued:

Do international relations precede or follow (logically) fundamental social relations? There can be no doubt that they follow. Any organic innovation in the social structure, through its technical-military expressions, modifies organically absolute and relative relations in the international field, too.

Historical materialists understand states as an ‘amalgam of social, political, ideological and economic elements organised in a particular manner… not so much a set of functions or a group of actors as an expression of power’. This is the meaning of Marx’s remark that the state is ‘the official résumé of society’. Subaltern realism’s focus on ‘regime security’, on this view, misses the point: regimes are variables within the limits set by the current state of social development, and depend on the political practice of agents divided into classes. Reifying a regime as the referent object of security ignores its basis in relations of social power and tends towards, especially in the work of Mohammed Ayoob, subaltern realism’s foremost theorist, a legitimisation of a particular status quo.

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46 Ibid., 24. My emphasis.
47 Ibid., 25. My emphasis.
52 Hewison, Robison, and Rodan, ‘State Power’, 4-5.
53 Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1956), 156.
54 Poulantzas, Political Power, 151-154.
55 Ayoob, Security Predicament.
This approach seeks to uncover the struggles over social and political power as the motive force for political outcomes. The state reflects a particular unequal, unstable equilibrium between social forces. Because it is unstable, the social order is contingent, not fixed, and must constantly be remade. This is a major function of the capitalist state. Because it is unequal, however, the dominant social forces will seek to use the state – which, for all that it is a ‘résumé of society’, also marshals unparalleled instrumental power – to shape the process of social conflict: to empower its friends and to suppress its enemies. This is encompassed within the practice of ‘statecraft’, understood not only as activities designed to achieve certain economic, political or military objectives, but as a constitutive practice aimed at assimilating individual subjects into a specific political and social order. Politics is seen as being about policy and concerned with specific decisions which directly and indirectly influence the distribution of wealth, power, and the structure of social relationships... policy formation is not seen to be value-neutral, but is rather seen to take place within the context of specific relations of social and political domination, a system in which the state takes a critical, partisan role.

States’ external conduct, then, is not governed by abstract norms that have the capacity to ‘socialise’ states, nor does it reflect an effort to promote the interests of all their ‘constituents’, but reflects the pursuit of interests designed to facilitate the reproduction of a particular social order. Robert Cox showed how states, constituted by a specific balance of social forces and constrained by their knowledge of the limits imposed by that balance and the permissiveness of the international order, meant that

The internal and external applications of raison d'état are coherent and indivisible. There is a practical connection between the effort of a state to organise its society and its effort to maintain itself and pursue its goals in the interstate context.

Similarly, Justin Rosenberg emphasises the indivisibility of apparently ‘internal’ and ‘external’ factors in states’ efforts to reproduce social order. Just as revolutionary states seek to export social conflict, so others are prepared to intervene to restore a particular ‘order’:

But a counter-revolutionary foreign policy is rarely just a foreign policy. To a degree which varies with individual cases it is also directed inwards, a nationalist identification of certain programmes of domestic political change with a foreign threat. The Cold War, for example, always partook of this three-dimensionality... much of the history of the states-system has been distracted by such internationalisation of social conflict... states [were] involved as mediating

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56 Poulantzas, Political Power, 188-192.
the agency of social forces... So, however much states are compelled to prepare
against the possible behaviour of other states, the ‘international’ has also been
very much about the management of change in domestic political orders.60

The ‘purpose of intervention’, then, lies not in disembodied ‘norms’ but in the
attempt of states to manage social orders. Whether a state intervenes or not, and
crucially to what end (non)intervention is aimed, is fundamentally a question of
domestic social and political relationships which give rise to a certain set of interests
and ideologies. To adapt Cox’s famous dictum on theory, (non)intervention is always
for someone and for something.

We can sketch out very briefly how such an approach helps us make sense of
the line that states draw between sovereignty and intervention. In the wake of
Napoleon’s revolutionary wars, the Holy Alliance intervened to crush liberal
uprisings abroad as part of an attempt to manage their own unstable social orders at
home, which they feared would be undermined by the example of successful
revolutions elsewhere. British social order was not threatened by the emergence of
bourgeois rule and generally opposed intervention.61 Conversely, Britain did
intervene to create the conditions necessary for capital accumulation where extra-
European authorities could not do so.62 Major wars in the modern era frequently
destabilise social order and require significant concessions to achieve a new stable
equilibrium. Wilson’s concessions to Eastern European nationalism were a direct
direct response to Lenin’s call for universal self-determination, which threatened social
order in Western states and their imperial territories.63 Wilson’s concessions were,
notably, limited to non-radical claims to statehood, and combined with the
suppression of domestic radicalism in the USA.64 After 1945, state borders were
rigidly upheld despite frequently being hollow shells, in order to check local
radicalism; Western interventions sought to shore up the territorial status quo,65 and
opposed radical forces such as pan-Arabism and Communism.

The historical materialist approach is distinguished by its particular
understanding of the nature of politics and the state and by its direct engagement
with social forces, areas where IR theory is traditionally weak.66 It demands a
historical approach since orders are contingent and change over time, rather than
fixed and reiterative as in the ‘realist’ canon. Our attention is drawn away from
‘institutions’ and ‘norms’ standing over society to the social conflict that generates

60 Rosenberg, Empire of Civil Society, 35.
61 Cox, Production, Power and World Order, 122-126. See also Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of
European Politics, 1763-1848 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), 596-621. Schroeder’s analysis tends to privilege
the ‘moral’ beliefs of statesmen but his empirical evidence makes it quite clear that entire social orders
were felt to be at stake.
(1953).
63 Arno. J Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles,
Christopher J. Bickerton, Philip Cunliffe, and Alexander Gourevitch, (eds.), Politics Without Sovereignty:
65 Ayoob, Security Predicament, 82.
66 A notable exception is E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International
Relations, 2nd ed. ed. (London: Macmillan, 1946). Carr’s classification as a ‘realist’ tends to mask his
implicit historical materialist methodology, which was arguably his most important and yet most
ignored contribution.
and thus explains them, and therefore insights from critical political economy will be of particular value. In the following sections I will briefly sketch out how this approach can help us understand intervention and sovereignty in relation to ASEAN.

3. Social Conflict and (Non)Interference in Southeast Asia

3.1 From Konfrontasi to ASEAN: The Emergence of 'Non-Interference'

Accounts of ASEAN’s origins typically begin with Konfrontasi, the 1963-66 confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia over disputed territory in Borneo, and ASEAN is envisaged as a benign mechanism for ‘regional reconciliation’, either as a thin sort of international society or as a framework for the generation of shared norms or identities. As noted above, scholars then agree the ‘cardinal norm’ was non-interference. Conversely, a historical materialist approach emphasises how ASEAN was developed as a means of managing social relations, for which a moderation of inter-state relations was a necessary first step. Bluntly put, to retain existing capitalist social relations in the face of communist revolution in Indochina and the threat of it at home, ASEAN states cooperated to cease fighting with one another to permit a focus on economic development, and to suppress radicalism at home and abroad. As Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik pointed out,

Although from the outset ASEAN was conceived as an organisation for economic, social and cultural cooperation… it was the fact that there was a convergence in the political outlook of the five prospective member-nations… which provided the main stimulus to join together in ASEAN… the shaping of a coordinated approach among the nations of Southeast Asia toward the problems of peace, stability and development had become an urgent necessity… the Southeast Asian countries must develop the capacity to live with a minimum degree of internal disturbance and external interference, so as to enable the establishment of relative peace and stability, without which national development becomes practically impossible.

This ‘convergence in political outlook’ was occasioned only by vast social conflict in Indonesia. President Sukarno’s ‘Guided Democracy’ was seeking to balance the power of the military, which had acquired a direct stake in capitalist social relations by expropriating Dutch enterprises, and revolutionary forces headed by the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), whose members numbered three million, with an additional twelve million in affiliated organisations. In an attempt to ride these contradictory forces, Sukarno had embarked on an anti-

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imperialist crusade, which included withdrawal from the UN to form a ‘Conference of Emerging Forces’ and de facto alliance with China, and was proposing to ‘crush’ the neo-imperialist stooge, Malaysia. The Philippines supported Konfrontasi in the hope that Singaporean radicals would thereby be denied the use of Borneo as a springboard for subverting Philippine provinces. Malaysia doggedly refused to relinquish the Borneo states as they were needed to avoid ethnic Chinese – who made up the bulk of the Malayan Communist Party, against whom the British and their successor regime fought a brutal war, pushing the MCP to the Thai border by 1960 – becoming the dominant demographic group. Konfrontasi was only ended by the intervention of Indonesian generals (encouraged by the US, which feared Indonesia was about to go communist and enflame the Afro-Asian world) headed by Suharto, who took over the Indonesian state and directly and indirectly via sponsored militias, slaughtered up to one million communists and alleged sympathisers and rounded 750,000 more into concentration camps. Suharto, having negotiated behind Sukarno’s back with Malaysia, now brought Konfrontasi to a close.

Attempts at regionalism before this, Thailand’s Foreign Minister pointed out, had produced ‘depressingly negative’ results. Bluntly put, vast social change – specifically, a million deaths – was necessary before ASEAN could be founded. Yet despite the PKI’s defeat, a ‘red scare’ continued in Indonesia, the 5,000 guerrillas and 25,000 members of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) were effectively ruling over tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of Thai citizens, the Philippines’ 30,000 communist fighters had seized control of Central Luzon (site of a US air force base) with observers predicting a ‘major insurgent threat’ and a ‘vast social upheaval in the near future’, while Singapore’s government was so fearful of communist resurgence that it was still rooting suspected communists out of local government as late as 1995. In order to defend the domestic status quo, ASEAN elites agreed urgent

75 Cribb, ‘Genocide’, 233-6. The Army claimed to be reacting to a PKI coup attempt on 30 September 1965. Evidence of PKI involvement is weak, while army involvement has long been suspected; see Greg Poulgrain, ‘Who Plotted the 1965 Coup?’ Inside Indonesia 57:1 (1999). The US assisted in the killings by providing vital communications equipment, medicines, food aid, and lists of suspected communists, even as the scale of the mass slaughter was becoming clear, urged on by the Thai government. See FRUS, 1964-68 (Vol. XXVI), 290, 302, 315, 317-8, 322-3, 330, 333, 339, 343-4, 362-3, 365-71, 380, 386, 401-2, 406-7.
79 Alexander, International Maoism, 304.
80 FRUS, 1964-68 (Vol. XXVI), 771, 783.

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economic development was required.\textsuperscript{82} Thus, ASEAN’s founding document focuses on cooperation for economic development and ‘to ensure [members’] stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities’.\textsuperscript{83}

To ‘decode’ the ASEAN Declaration, in a period where no little ‘national identity’ existed to be ‘preserved’ but was being actively contested by forces seeking wildly different social orders, ASEAN was developed to buy time for its elites to impose conservative, capitalist order on their highly disparate polities. Thus although this certainly did involve regional reconciliation and the creation of a favourable international climate, the ultimate purpose was to defend a particular vision of social order. The realisation of the vision involved the conscious manipulation of culture into a ‘hegemonic’ form serving authoritarian ends,\textsuperscript{84} and a violent state-making process described by the head of Thailand’s Internal Security Operations Command as the ‘colonisation’ of their own peoples.\textsuperscript{85} The concern with ‘external interference’ flowed from the widespread belief that Communism was an ideology fundamentally alien to the region (and its ‘national’ identities), such that ASEAN’s communist insurgencies were the result of ‘infiltration’, a form of external ‘subversion’ promoted by foreign powers – particularly China, because of the association of ‘overseas Chinese’ with communism.\textsuperscript{86} It was this which caused Suharto to identify China as ‘the enemy’, explaining to the US Ambassador that ASEAN was formed ‘to pave [the] way for closer association with neighbouring countries against the menace of Communist China’.\textsuperscript{87} As Lee Kuan Yew revealed:

\begin{quote}
The unspoken objective was to gain strength through solidarity ahead of the power vacuum that would come with an impending British and later a possible US withdrawal... We had a common enemy – the communist threat in guerrilla insurgencies, backed by North Vietnam, China and the Soviet Union. We needed stability and growth to counter and deny the communists the social and economic conditions for revolutions... While ASEAN’s declared objectives were economic, social and cultural, all knew that progress in economic cooperation
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\textsuperscript{87} \textit{FRUS}, 1964-68 (Vol. XXVI), 433.
would be slow. We were banding together more for political objectives, stability and security.88

3.2 Counter-Insurgency, Counter-Revolution and ‘Normative’ Evolution

This task was particularly urgent in the context of the 1967 announcement that Britain would withdraw all forces ‘east of Suez’ by 1971, and mounting fears about American staying power in Indochina. In the years following ASEAN’s formation, ASEAN states ceased supporting each other’s insurgents. In 1968, prompted by Thai and Indonesian efforts at mediation, the Philippines agreed to cease attempts to subvert the Malaysian province of Sabah and Malaysia in turn dropped its support for the Moro Liberation Front (MLF) operating in the southern Philippines.89 Konfrontasi gave way to Malaysian-Indonesian cooperation in their campaigns against communist guerrillas,90 and both states worked to defuse the Manila-MLF conflict, helping end Libyan backing for the Moros and dismantle a threat to the Marcos government. Malaysian-Thai cooperation against the MCP and CPT along their common border also helped stabilise existing orders,91 and by the mid-1970s bilateral treaties had been signed between nearly all ASEAN governments on cooperation against insurgents.92

The emerging ‘norm’ of non-interference was thus in effect an elite alliance against the revolutionary segments of their own populations. The ‘unexplained preferences’ being ‘promoted’ were not, pace Krasner, those of all of their ‘constituents’ but the region’s endangered ruling classes. This in turn shaped the nature of adherence to the ‘norm’. Rather than adhering to their supposedly ‘cherished norm’ of non-interference, ASEAN elites were actually deeply implicated in US intervention in Indochina. This ranged from urging deeper intervention, especially in Laos, providing military facilities for US war-making, sending arms and materiel to beleaguered anti-communist governments, providing training and other forms of support, and intervening directly by sending artillery battalions to Laos.93 This suggests that the ‘norm’ had no autonomous power to ‘socialise’ elites and define their interests, as Finnemore (and many students of ASEAN) might suggest. It also falsifies sub-altern realism’s similar insistence that all ‘third-world elites have internalised these values to an astonishing degree’.94 The purpose of ASEAN’s covert intervention in Indochina was to defend social order at home. As Lee Kuan Yew said in 1967, if America failed was defeated, ‘there would be fighting in Thailand within

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88 Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore Story, 369-70.
90 Ibid., 574.
91 Antolik, ASEAN, 78-81, 54-60.
94 Ayoob, Security Predicament, 71.
one-and-a-half to two years, in Malaysia shortly thereafter, and within three years, “I would be hanging in the public square””. 95

Indeed, the further development of ASEAN’s so-called ‘normative’ architecture can be explained with the ratcheting up of the threat with America’s defeat in Vietnam. The Nixon doctrine prompted grave fears about America’s commitment to defend anti-communist governments,96 and the 1970 cessation of bombing in Indochina led to a revolutionary upswing across the region. China and Vietnam began aiding comrades in Laos and Indochina while a road was build to the Thai border to facilitate aid to the CPT.97 Declaring that bourgeois parliamentarians were incapable of maintaining ‘internal security’, the Thai military seized power,98 and Marcos declared his own dictatorship in Manila, claiming the existing order was ‘imperilled by the danger of violent overthrow’.99

This was the context for the emergence of the Zone of Of Peace, Freedom And Neutrality (ZOPFAN) Declaration, which is typically understood as an attempt to exclude great powers from regional affairs and allegedly forms a milestone in the ‘norms’ of ‘regional autonomy’ and ‘non-interference’.100 ASEAN called for a ‘relaxation of tensions’ to create a region ‘free from any form or manner of interference by outside powers’ and the closure of foreign bases.101 Leifer criticised the lack of ‘purposive action’ to implement ZOPFAN, claiming ASEAN was deeply divided between, e.g., Thailand’s desire to retain US bases and Indonesian opposition, supposedly by virtue of its position as a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement.102 But Indonesia’s non-alignment had long been discarded: behind the scenes, Jakarta responded to the Nixon Doctrine by putting itself forward as a regional policeman capable of rushing to the aid of imperilled capitalist governments,103 failed to oppose British Commonwealth bases in Malaysia, and insisted on a US role in the region until the non-communist governments could stabilise their rule.104 Indonesian acceptance of the closure of US bases in Thailand was premised, Malik said, on a ‘common understanding [that] it would not be significant whether you stay’ since aid would continue in other ways.105 By burnishing ASEAN’s neutralist credentials and aspirations, ZOPFAN’s goal was to rhetorically distance the organisation from the US and entice ascendant communist forces to respect the formal neutrality of the Laotian and Cambodian governments and adopt a self-denying ordinance that would leave ASEAN’s precarious social

95 FRUS, 1964-68 (Vol. XXVI), 636.
96 This was compounded by the Symington Hearings in the US Senate, which undermined in the eyes of the region the assurances Nixon did offer, and by Nixon’s shock visit to China in 1972. On Thailand’s fears, for example, see FRUS, 1969-76 (vol. XX), 2, 15, 93, 106, 108, 168, 197, 242, 330-7, 340.
97 Ibid., 21, 86, 173, 242.
98 Ibid., 307-9, 315.
100 Acharya, Security Community, 52-8.
103 FRUS, 1969-76 (vol. XX), 566, 589, 607, 663-9, 677. This scheme was apparently thwarted only by American concerns as to its viability: ibid., pp. 654-5, 675-6.
104 Ibid., 574, 577, 595, 692-3, 695, 711ff, 721.
orders intact. Meanwhile ASEAN states continued to use their formal non-alignment as a cover for efforts to prop up tottering non-communist regimes in Vientiane and Phnom Penh. There was no genuine commitment to any ‘norm’ of sovereignty or non-interference abstracted from the attempt to preserve a particular social and political order.

This was again illustrated when the 1975 communist victories across Indochina gave a boost to the region’s revolutionary movements comparable to the impact of Dien Bien Phu on anti-colonial struggles, and caused near hysteria in ASEAN capitals. The military again took over in Thailand in a bloody anti-communist crack-down. Suharto informed President Ford that ‘insurgency has now reached the national capitals in Thailand and Malaysia’ and constituted ‘a greater danger than an overt physical threat’, warning that ‘the communists are trying to subvert by cutting links between ASEAN countries… We need to fortify Malaysia but this is not easy to do because of the Chinese influence’ there, which could ‘bring the Communists right to our threshold’. ASEAN responded by intensifying their counter-insurgency campaigns domestically, and issuing a new declaration internationally: the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC).

TAC is often seen as a touchstone of the so-called ‘ASEAN way’, enunciating a set of ‘norms’ to guide members’ conduct: ‘mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations’; ‘the right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion, or coercion’; and ‘non-interference in the affairs of one another’. However, rather than representing some disembodied normative architecture, it is obvious from the historical context that TAC was ‘designed to conciliate the victorious communist regimes by announcing a self-denying regional ordinance. This, it was hoped, would appease these states and persuade them to join ASEAN in establishing a collaborative regional environment’. TAC’s emphasis on the ‘peaceful settlement of disputes’ makes perfect sense given that ASEAN was now confronted with the very regimes its members had conspired unsuccessfully to prevent coming to power. The following sections briefly summarise ASEAN states’ actual interventionist practices given their radical neighbours’ refusal to accept TAC’s quid pro quo.

4. ASEAN States’ Interventions in Burma, East Timor and Cambodia

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111 Although subversion rather than invasion was the expected scenario, military ASEAN states’ combined forces were vastly outnumbered by Vietnam’s battle-hardened army alone, which by 1979 numbered a million, while ASEAN’s armies totalled 472,500 and were not grouped in any military pact. Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*, 1979-1980 (London: ISS, 1979), 66-73.
It will be noted that Burma, East Timor and Cambodia were not ASEAN members during the Cold War, and thus a basic objection to the claim that ASEAN violated the supposed norm of non-interference in these states might be that the norm only applied within the Association. However, constructivists argue that norms ‘socialise’ states or elites, producing a transformatory effect, and re-constitute interests.\(^\text{112}\) The logic of this claim is that ‘socialised’ actors are ideationally motivated and should behave uniformly regardless of who they are interacting with. Furthermore, virtually all ASEAN scholars claim, for instance, that ASEAN’s policy towards Cambodia was motivated by ‘embarrassment’ at the violation of its ‘cherished norm’ of non-interference by Vietnam’s 1978 invasion.\(^\text{113}\) This again implies that ASEAN behaved as though its ‘norms’ applied universally, rather than merely serving an instrumental purpose within a closed institutional space. I therefore choose to challenge these scholars on their own terrain.

4.1 Burma

Burma was a significant site of Cold War intervention after a precipitate British withdrawal, followed by the assassination of most of the Anti-Fascist People’s Liberation Front leadership who had led the independence movement, left the country in chaos, riven by communist and ethnic insurgency. Following its defeat in China, a Guomindang army retreated into Burma, establishing a state within a state in the Shan province. They were actively supported by the US, in league with Thailand, with the Bangkok-based Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) playing a significant coordinating role in forging contacts with the nationalist Chinese remnants, and smuggling arms and other materiel.\(^\text{114}\) Chiang Mai in northern Thailand was described by the outraged government in Rangoon as ‘in effect a rear base’ for the Guomindang and allied Burmese ethnic rebels who formed a buffer to prevent Burmese and Thai communists from joining forces.\(^\text{115}\) The Guomindang paid for their US-Thai backing by harvesting opium on a grand scale, which was exported via CIA aircraft, thus beginning the illicit drugs trade which gave the ‘Golden Triangle’ its name. The Burmese army, in response to this massive challenge to national sovereignty, was forced to take on many ‘state-building’ responsibilities, such as development projects and \textit{de facto} governance activities, while the formal state itself began to degrade. This meant that, when in 1958 the democratic government in Rangoon fell prey to internal divisions and effectively collapsed, the army, fearing a communist takeover, stepped in as a ‘caretaker government’; when this happened a second time, in 1962, amid rumours of a ‘foreign plot’ to overthrow the government and draw Burma into SEATO, the army took over completely.\(^\text{116}\) In a very real sense, Burma’s problems today are directly traceable to these destabilising early Cold War interventions.

\(^\text{112}\) Acharya, \textit{Security Community}.


\(^\text{115}\) Ibid., 153.

\(^\text{116}\) Ibid., 176-96.
In 1967, ASEAN proposed that Burma join its ranks, but Rangoon refused, unwilling to compromise its actual non-alignment by joining a de facto outpost of the Western camp, for fear of provoking China into escalating its support of the ongoing insurgency of the large Communist Party of Burma (CPB).\(^{117}\) Thailand remained suspicious of the army’s ‘Burmese Socialist Programme Party’ government and sustained its support for various anti-Rangoon forces in Burma. Thailand had backed the Guomindang to serve as an anti-communist gendarme in Burma, but Rangoon successfully internationalised the issue, forcing the US to evacuate many of the Chinese to Taiwan. However, with the upsurge in revolutionary activity in 1975-76, evidence emerged to show that the CPT was already being supplied Laotian and Cambodian borders, and a link-up between the CPB and CPT was widely predicted in 1975-6. CPB victory in Burma could not be ruled out, raising the fearful prospect of Thailand’s encirclement by radical forces determined to assist Thai revolutionaries, who now counted 7,000 men under arms and effectively ruled over a million Thai citizens. Bangkok thus fell back on the remaining Guomindang forces that had retreated to Thailand (the third and fifth armies), which operated from bases inside Thailand to serve as a ‘virulently communist border militia’ to keep the two countries’ communist parties divided, and helped police/terrorise Thai citizens of dubious loyalties in northern Thailand and guard development projects designed to regain popular allegiance. Radical Burmese rebels were expelled from Thailand, while the anti-communists Karen National Union (KNU) was used in a similar way to the Guomindang, its leader, Bo Mya, describing the KNU as a ‘foreign legion’ for Thailand. In return, the Thai army engaged in black market trade and supplied weapons and ammunition to allied rebel groups.\(^{118}\)

These relationships, which remained close until the late 1980s, continued to destabilise Burma and fuelled the ethnic insurgencies that remain unsettled to this day. The KNU was such a successful proxy that it freed up large segments of the Thai army to perform counter-insurgency warfare against the CPT and to concentrate troops along the Laotian and Cambodian borders, which had a significant impact on the attempt of the military-bourgeois regime to stabilise social order in a manner commensurate with its interests. From this brief sketch it is clear that Thailand, far from being ‘socialised’ into a norm of non-interference, consciously intervened in Burmese affairs in order to keep the social and political order contested there and, in turn, to help manage social order at home.

4.2 East Timor

In 1974, Portugal’s fascist Caetano regime was overthrown, and Lisbon began dismantling the Portuguese empire, including the eastern half of Timor, on the edge of the Indonesian archipelago. Indonesia had never laid claim to the territory and Adam Malik assured the fledgling independence movements there that their right to self-determination would be respected. However, the Suharto regime’s attitude shifted when a more radical administration came to power in Lisbon in September 1974 and the East Timorese independence parties, particularly the Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente (Fretilin), became increasingly progressive with an emphasis on rapid independence, land reform, economic redistribution and

\(^{117}\) Severino, *ASEAN Community*, 44-45.

\(^{118}\) Smith, *Burma*, 293-9.
anti-imperialism. As noted above, Suharto feared that his neighbours were dominoes waiting to be toppled by the tide of communism sweeping in from Indochina. The establishment of a potentially successful, progressive, democratic state on Indonesia’s borders could provide an opening for infiltration, and at the very least would provide an inspirational example to Indonesia’s oppressed masses and separatist forces. These anxieties were heightened by unprecedented social unrest at home, where a student movement protesting against the New Order’s authoritarianism and corruption razed hundreds of buildings and disrupted the visit of the Japanese Prime Minister, in scenes not repeated until the early 1990s. Furthermore, leading regime figures had apparently been intriguing with the students, and the state oil company, Pertamina, a lynchpin of social stability through its leading role in economic development, went scandalously bankrupt. As Benedict Anderson argues, this conjuncture of destabilising, fear-inducing events was sufficient to convince Suharto of the case made by the generals running the state intelligence agency, Bakin, that East Timor should not be allowed to become independent.

Indonesia thus secured US and Australian backing and launched Operation Komodo, designed to foment civil war in East Timor to create a pretext for intervention. This included spreading propaganda that Soviet submarines were operating in Timorese waters and Vietnamese and Chinese generals had arrived in East Timor to smuggle arms to and train Fretilin, which was denounced as a ‘communist’ group plotting to take over the territory by force. The União Democrática Timorense (UDT), Fretilin’s conservative, less popular, rival party, was courted and threatened by Jakarta, and a Malaysian envoy reinforced the message that ASEAN would not tolerate the emergence of a radical state in the region. In August 1975, UDT staged a ‘show of strength’, attempting to grab control by force, but was comprehensively defeated in a two-week struggle by Fretilin. UDT troops and civilians fleeing the fighting retreated to Indonesian West Timor, where UDT leaders were forced to sign a petition for integration with Indonesia. Jakarta then invaded East Timor, claiming that the civil war was still raging and that merely Indonesian ‘volunteers’ were crossing the border to help resist Fretilin ‘atrocities’, a fiction that Malaysia sought to help sustain by providing supplies of small arms that were not traceable to Indonesia. Jakarta had, however, vastly underestimated the Timorese desire for independence and soon found itself bogged down in fierce fighting and launched a full-scale invasion. Fretilin, having begged the Portuguese to return to complete decolonisation in an orderly fashion, felt compelled to issue a unilateral declaration of independence on 28 November 1975, founding the Democratic Republic of East Timor, which was recognised immediately by 15 other states. Indonesia nonetheless pressed ahead, forcing Fretilin into the mountains and corralling that part of the population which did not flee with it into concentration

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122 Dunn, Timor, 88, 118, 166.
123 Budiardjo and Liong, East Timor, 14.
125 Dunn, Timor, 219, 228.
camps. Jakarta staged a puppet ‘People’s Assembly’, literally abducting some of the ‘representatives’ off the streets in order to give a tissue-thin veneer of self-determination as, under the watchful eye of Indonesian troops and ambassadors from ASEAN and a handful of other states, a formal petition was issued for integration with Indonesia.\textsuperscript{126}

This was the beginning of a 27-year long occupation and counter-insurgency which has often been described as ‘genocidal’. ASEAN states rallied around Jakarta in the United Nations and Non-Aligned Movement, both of which raised objections to this brutal annexation of what either remained a Portuguese colony or had become an independent sovereign state, depending on one’s stance. ASEAN echoed Indonesia’s claim that an act self-determination had taken place and argued, perversely, that to criticise Jakarta was to violate the principle of non-interference. By the mid-1990s, ASEAN states were still suppressing efforts by civil society groups to stage meetings and raise awareness of the East Timor issue in response to Indonesian threats of serious repercussions that doubtless also constituted interference in its partners’ internal affairs.\textsuperscript{127} Malaysia continued to provide special assistance to Jakarta by providing four Sabre jets that were used to bomb Fretilin positions.\textsuperscript{128}

Only Singapore briefly demurred, by abstaining on the East Timor question in the UN for two years. Although this muted protest might be seen as adherence (however temporary) to the idea of non-interference in East Timorese affairs, what is truly remarkable is that a micro-state which only a decade earlier had been under threat of invasion by its Indonesian neighbour would so rapidly acquiesce in the forcible annexation of another state in an identical situation.\textsuperscript{129} ASEAN solidarity, once more, related not to ‘shared norms’ but to the inter-elite counter-revolutionary alliance that underpinned ASEAN and it’s ‘normative’ regime. Indonesia’s intervention in East Timor, and the ideological cover that ASEAN attempted to provide, once more sprang from a concern to defend a social order that was perceived as imperilled by the threat of revolution.

### 4.3 Cambodia\textsuperscript{130}

In December 1978, in response to numerous attacks and provocations, Vietnam invaded Cambodia alongside a rebel faction of the Khmer Rouge which had unsuccessfully attempted to topple Pol Pot before retreating to Vietnam. The Khmer Rouge regime rapidly collapsed and the rebel faction was installed as the new government of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea. After the panic of 1975, Bangkok had managed to reach a grisly modus vivendi with Pol Pot, whereby the Khmer Rouge ceased its support for the CPT and the Thai army shot anyone trying to flee Cambodia, but now the army of Vietnam, whose revolution Thailand had sought to crush, was massed on the border, raising again the spectre of toppling

\textsuperscript{126} Ramos Horta, \textit{Funu}, 183.


\textsuperscript{128} Budiardjo and Liong, \textit{East Timor}, 14.

\textsuperscript{129} Lee Kuan Yew reports that in 1963 an Indonesian envoy had stated, ‘Indonesia will come here and look after this country’, and Lee ‘did not dismiss his aspirations to take over Singapore as idle talk’; and of course \textit{Konfrontasi} was directed at the Malaysian federation as a whole, of which Singapore was a part until 1965. Lee Kuan Yew, \textit{Singapore Story}, 295.

\textsuperscript{130} For references and a lengthier exposition of the following section, see Lee Jones, ‘ASEAN’s Intervention in Cambodia: From Cold War to Conditionality’, \textit{Pacific Review} 20:4 (2007).
dominoes. Thailand, as the ‘front-line state’, corralled ASEAN into opposing Vietnam’s invasion as a violation of the non-interference principle. ASEAN scholars have tended almost without exception to take this at face value as proof that ASEAN was motivated by a sense of normative outrage, but looking at the quality of its response makes clear the underlying reasons.

Thailand’s army rescued senior Khmer Rouge figures from being killed or captured by the invading Vietnamese and provided a safe haven for Pol Pot’s forces to regroup on Thai soil, where 2,000 stragglers were eventually rebuilt into a 40,000-strong force. Bangkok entered a tacit alliance with China to this end: in an attempt to rescue its erstwhile client, Beijing funded the Khmer Rouge recovery and in return dropped its support for the CPT and sent $283m in aid from 1985-89 alone. By 1980, 500 tons of arms per month were being funnelled to the Khmer Rouge, and for the next decade $100m a year in military aid reached the deposed regime. Thai artillery was regularly used to cover forays into Cambodia while Thai soldiers blocked any Vietnamese attempts at hot pursuit. ASEAN diplomacy, threats and promises of aid were instrumental in corralling the Khmer Rouge and non-communist resistance groups together into the so-called Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) in 1982, the goal of which, Malaysia’s Foreign Ministry explained, was to ‘beef-up’ the non-communist elements and ‘increase the chances of the non-communist forces returning to Phnom Penh through a political settlement’. It was also a response to fears that ASEAN’s hitherto successful campaign for the overthrown genocidal regime to retain its UN seat (an unprecedented outcome in international relations) might fail, since a few countries had signalled their intention to withdraw their support.

The ‘dilution’ of the Khmer Rouge (more on paper than in reality) allowed Western states to keep supporting ASEAN’s UN campaign against Vietnam, and to respond to ASEAN’s calls for aid for the deposed regime, which was particularly crucial after the Vietnamese 1984-85 dry season offensive that wiped out nearly all the CGDK’s camps. Washington sent $20m immediately and annual aid averaged $32m per year thereafter. Although Jakarta blocked Singaporean efforts to make ASEAN assistance for the CGDK explicit, a covert Singaporean, Malaysian, Thai and American group was regularly convened in Bangkok to coordinate the supply of arms, ammunition, training, communications equipment, food, and the establishment of a Khmer-language radio station with British assistance. The ASEAN states involved dispensed about $70m and were critical in persuading the US to participate. ASEAN also became expert at manipulating Cambodia’s refugees. Having initially rejected them in a fit of anti-communist hysteria as ‘fifth columnists’ and ‘human bombs’, pushing them back over the border into minefields or threatening to shoot them on sight, ASEAN now corralled the refugees into camps that by 1987 were under the full control of the CGDK factions. ASEAN campaigned annually for international aid, much of which was directly appropriated by the CGDK. As one senior UN official stated, ‘the border operation is a political operation. It’s the UN system being used to keep the game going’. Another remarked, ‘if the UN stopped feeding the soldiers’ wives and families, the resistance would stop’.

ASEAN’s command of the issue allowed it to dictate the terms of what became known as a ‘comprehensive political settlement’, which were sketched out in the first few years after Vietnam’s invasion. The Indonesian and Malaysian
governments met at Kuantan in March 1980, proposing what one scholar called the ‘Finlandization’ of Cambodia, i.e., the neutralisation of the country with Vietnam retaining effective veto power over much of Cambodian foreign and defence policy. Singapore and Thailand rejected the ‘Kuantan principle’ not on the grounds that this permanent interference in the affairs of a sovereign state was normatively unacceptable, but because it might ‘encourage’ Hanoi. Eventually, however, the ‘Kuantan principle’ was translated into a comprehensive plan for the neutralisation of Cambodia to be implemented by a UN operation which would oversee the withdrawal of foreign forces, ensure law and order during the transitional period, and hold elections to determine the future government. These plans for a ‘comprehensive political settlement’ essentially institutionalised in various UN resolutions the goals of ASEAN elites, enshrined in ASEAN’s own declarations: the UN even directly endorsed ZOPFAN as the basis for regional order. Although ASEAN had to wait until the end of the Cold War to see its plans implemented, and lost direct control of the process to the Security Council’s permanent members in the final instance, the basic contours of what became the 1991 Paris Peace Accords and the subsequent UN Transitional Administration in Cambodia were determined by ASEAN diplomacy in the early 1980s.

ASEAN’s behaviour towards Cambodia clearly comprised egregious acts of interference in the political affairs of an external political community, and is consistent with the other interventions identified above in stemming from an attempt to manage threats to social order. ASEAN’s interventions in Cambodia had the effect of isolating the country (which had, after all, been subject to a vast US bombing campaign and then a genocidal campaign claiming 1.7m lives) from foreign aid and prolonging destabilising and debilitating armed conflict. Far from unifying ASEAN around ‘shared norms’, what drove the intervention was, once more, the inter-elite alliance against revolutionary social forces.

5. Conclusion

It should be clear from the foregoing that the idea that ASEAN has adhered strictly to a ‘norm’ of non-interference is simply not true. It would be easy, then, to write off ASEAN’s talk of non-interference as mere ‘organised hypocrisy’ – sovereignty when it suits. Certainly, the record exposes a phenomenal amount of hypocrisy, but Krasner’s version of realism is no more helpful in explaining ‘when it suits’ than constructivism, because it lacks any sense of social or political theory that can help us understand ‘unexplained preferences’. The historical materialist approach used in this paper has illustrated that what was at stake was a highly contested social order, and the interests being ‘promoted’ were those of that part of society which benefited from the fragile status quo. This, and only this, helps us explain the variation: where non-interference served this fundamental social goal, it was adhered to, as in the case of many intra-ASEAN interactions; where it did not, it was routinely violated.

Clearly, the decades following post-colonial independence, in the context of the Cold War, are a context in which we might expect to see social order as particularly contested. However, although social order is generally rather more stable today, because it is a creation of human agency, albeit mediated through social structures, it ultimately remains contingent, not fixed, and must be reproduced. This is as true in developed countries as developing ones, despite the fact that this process
is often more hidden and consensual there in comparison to the violence commonly associated with the third world – though clearly this is a very recent development, as the mass slaughters perpetrated by the Turkish state in Armenia, the French state in Algeria and the German state within and beyond its own borders during the twentieth century illustrate, to take just a few examples.

This carries potentially important insights for international theory. If the basic approach of this paper is correct, and extendable to other cases, it suggests that there is an organic relationship between domestic social order and what the ‘English School’ of IR theory terms ‘international society’, that is, the network of rules and institutions that govern interaction at the international level. The long-standing debate, for example, between ‘realists’ who argue that international law is violated the moment a state’s interests can be better pursued by so doing, and liberals, constructivists and other ‘idealists’ who expect states to adhere to laws out of a sense of moral or normative commitment, might be usefully enhanced or even supplanted by a historical materialist approach. Such an approach can help open up realism’s ‘black box’ by specifying what ‘unexplained preferences’ (i.e., state interests) might actually be, thus supplying the predictive power that realism tends to lack. It also acts as a critical counterweight to those pushing the power of ideas in isolation. No social order is complete without its ideological element, as the cases considered here have implicitly made clear: elites have a clear sense of what sort of order is ‘best’, and even if this (unsurprisingly) happens to coincide with their material interests, it is never directly reducible to them. Yet ideas are not autonomous actors capable of socialising individuals, still less states. As Marx and Engels wrote,

The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life... the direct efflux of their material behaviour... Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas... The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises... Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life.131

Understanding which ideas win out over others, and why, is not best approached by positing consensual, trans-historical ‘norms’ that stand over history, but by tracing the process out historically, by grasping it as part of conflictual, political activity, and thus inherently bound up with power and interests.

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