Paul Klemperer's Papers

This web site includes a collection of papers by Paul Klemperer and his co-authors. All papers are available in pdf format (version 3). Typically pdf files will be smaller than postscript files and so you are advised to use this option.

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Published papers are copyrighted by the publisher with the exception of Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature, for which Paul Klemperer retains the copyright. The copyright of unpublished papers is held by their authors. Users may make a single copy of published papers for educational purposes.

Please contact Maxine Collett or Paul Klemperer, if you have difficulty in downloading any of the files and we will send you a hard copy.


ONLINE BOOK Auctions: Theory and Practice (full draft), 2004, Paul Klemperer.
details of Princeton University Press book Auctions: Theory and Practice 2004, Paul Klemperer.

Book: The Economic Theory of Auctions 2000, Paul Klemperer (ed.).


Product-Mix Auctions, Current Draft, Paul Klemperer. Related interview (see qus 3-10)

Understanding Preferences: "Demand Types", and the Existence of Equilibrium with Indivisibilities. Current Draft 2018 (first draft 2012), Elizabeth Baldwin and Paul Klemperer. Supplementary Appendix. Related Video

Equity Recourse Notes: Creating Counter-cyclical Bank Capital. Economic Journal, 2015, Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer. Supplementary Material. CEPR 2014 Discussion Paper version. 

Market-Based Bank Capital Regulation. Current Draft, 2013, Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer. Non-technical summary

Tropical Geometry to Analyse Demand. Current Draft, 2014 (first draft 2012), Elizabeth Baldwin and Paul Klemperer.

The Definition of Substitutes for Indivisible Goods. Preliminary Draft, 2012, Elizabeth Baldwin and Paul Klemperer.

Regulated Prices, Rent-Seeking, and Consumer Surplus. Journal of Political Economy, 2012, Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer. Summary.

The Product-Mix Auction: a New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods.  Journal of the European Economic Association,  2010, Paul Klemperer. 2008 version. Non-technical summary. Related interview (see qus 3-10)

A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2010,  Aytek Erdil and Paul Klemperer.

Reorganising the Banks: Focus on the Liabilities, Not the Assets 2009, Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer.

What is the Top Priority on Climate Change? in Global Sustainability,  H-J. Schellnhuber, M. Molina, N. Stern, V. Huber & S. Kadner (eds), 2009. Paul Klemperer. Summary.

Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions? American Economic Review, 2009. Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer.

A New Auction for Substitutes: Central-Bank Liquidity Auctions, "Toxic Asset" Auctions, and Variable Product-Mix Auctions. 2008. Now revised as Product-Mix Auctions 2008 version Paul Klemperer.

When are Auctions Best?, 2006. Now revised as 'Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?' (see above). Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer.

Bidding Markets, Occasional Paper No.1, UK Competition Commission, 2005. (Also reprinted in Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2007, and reprinted in Handbook of Competition Policy,  P. Buccirossi (ed.) 2008.)

  Competition Policy in Auctions and ‘Bidding Markets’. This is the same paper as “Bidding Markets” (see above). Paul Klemperer.

Network Effects and Switching Costs Two separate contributions to the new New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. S.N. Durlauf and L.E. Blume (eds.), Palgrave Macmillan (forthcoming). Paul Klemperer.

Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects  Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol 3. M. Armstrong and R. Porter (eds.), North-Holland 2007. Joseph Farrell and Paul Klemperer.

An Early Example of "Sniping" in an Auction Lagniappe to JPE, 2004. Paul Klemperer.

Auctions In The Social Science Encyclopedia, Vol 1, 3rd edition, A. Kuper and J. Kuper (eds.), Routledge, 2004, p. 48-50. Paul Klemperer.

Using and Abusing Economic Theory---Lessons from Auction Design 2002 Marshall Lecture to European Economic Association. (Also reprinted in Journal of the European Economic Association, 2003, and reprinted in Contemporary Issues in Economics and Econometrics, R. Becker S. Hurn (eds.) 2004, and reprinted in Applying the Dismal Science, I. McLean and C. Jennings (eds.) 2006.) Paul Klemperer. Spanish Translation.

Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Invited Lectures to 8th World Congress of the Econometric Society, M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen and S. Turnovsky (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2003. Paul Klemperer. [Zip file available]

What Really Matters in Auction Design Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2002. Paul Klemperer.

How (Not) to Run Auctions: the European 3G Telecom Auctions European Economic Review, 2002. (Also reprinted in Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunications, G. Illing and U. Klüh (eds.) 2003.) Paul Klemperer. Japanese Translation

The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences Economic Journal, 2002. Ken Binmore and Paul Klemperer.

Some Observations on the British and German 3G Telecom Auctions ifo Studien (CES ifo Economic Studies) 2002. (Also reprinted in Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunications, G. Illing (ed.), MIT Press, 2004). Paul Klemperer.

Prices and the Winner's Curse Rand Journal of Economics, 2002.  Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer.

Advantaged Bidders and Spectrum Prices: An Empirical Analysis Preliminary abstract. Paul Klemperer and Marco Pagnozzi.

An Early Example of the "Winner's Curse" in an Auction Lagniappe to JPE, 2001. Paul Klemperer and Peter Temin.

Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature Introductory chapter to The Economic Theory of Auctions, P. Klemperer (ed.), Edward Elgar (pub.), 2000. (Also published in Journal of Economic Surveys, 1999, and reprinted in The Current State of Economic Science S. Dahiya (ed.), 1999.) Paul Klemperer. 2004 Afterword.

  An Equilibrium Theory of Rationing RAND Journal of Economics, 2000. Richard Gilbert and Paul Klemperer.

A Note on Ortega Reichert's "A Sequential Game with Information Flow" In The Economic Theory of Auctions, P. Klemperer (ed.), Edward Elgar (pub.), 2000. Simon Board and Paul Klemperer.

Applying Auction Theory to Economics, 1999. Now revised as 'Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory' (see above). Paul Klemperer

Toeholds and Takeovers Journal of Political Economy, 1999. (Also reprinted in New Research in Corporate Finance and Banking, B. Biais and M. Pagano (eds.), Oxford University Press, 2002.) Jeremy Bulow, Ming Huang and Paul Klemperer. Tehnical Supplementary Paper: General Characterization, Existence, and Uniqueness of Equilibrium, 1996.

The Generalized War of Attrition American Economic Review, 1999. Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer.

  Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies Michigan Law Review, 1999. Ian Ayres and Paul Klemperer.

Discussion of European Insurance Markets Economic Policy, 1999. Paul Klemperer.

Auctions with Almost Common Values: The "Wallet Game" and its Applications European Economic Review, 1998. Paul Klemperer.

The Tobacco Deal Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, 1998. Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer.

Do Firms' Product Lines Include Too Many Varieties? RAND Journal of Economics, 1997. Paul Klemperer and Jorge Padilla.

Auctions Versus Negotiations American Economic Review, 1996. Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer.

Competition when Consumers have Switching Costs: An Overview with Applications to Industrial Organization, Macroeconomics, and International Trade Review of Economic Studies, 1995. Paul Klemperer.

Rational Frenzies and Crashes Journal of Political Economy, 1994. Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer.

Equilibrium Product Lines: Competing Head-to-Head May be Less Competitive American Economic Review, 1992.  Paul Klemperer.

 Multi-Period Competition with Switching Costs Econometrica, 1992. Alan Beggs and Paul Klemperer. (Working paper (1989) version available here).

How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be? RAND Journal of Economics, 1990. (Also reprinted in The Economics of Intellectual Property, R. Towse and R. Holzhauer (eds.), 2002.) Paul Klemperer.

Price Wars Caused by Switching Costs Review of Economic Studies, 1989. Paul Klemperer.

Exchange Rate Pass-Through When Market Share Matters American Economic Review, 1989. Kenneth Froot and Paul Klemperer.

Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly Under Uncertainty Econometrica, 1989. Paul Klemperer and Margaret Meyer.

Welfare Effects of Entry into Markets with Switching Costs Journal of Industrial Economics, 1988. Paul Klemperer.

Consistent Conjectures Equilibria: A Reformulation Showing Non-uniqueness Economics Letters, 1988. Paul Klemperer and Margaret Meyer.

Entry Deterrence in Markets with Consumer Switching Costs Economic Journal, 1987. Paul Klemperer.

The Competitiveness of Markets with Switching Costs RAND Journal of Economics, 1987. Paul Klemperer.

Markets With Consumer Switching Costs Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1987. (Also reprinted in The Economics of Business Strategy, J. Kay (ed.), 2003.) Paul Klemperer.

Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently Econometrica, 1987. Peter Cramton, Robert Gibbons and Paul Klemperer.

Price competition vs. quantity competition: the role of uncertainty RAND Journal of Economics, 1986. (Also reprinted in Cournot Oligopoly: Characterization and Applications, A. Daughety (ed), Cambridge University Press, 1988.) Paul Klemperer and Margaret Meyer.

Holding Idle Capacity to Deter Entry Economic Journal, 1985. Jeremy Bulow, John Geanakoplos and Paul Klemperer.

Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements Journal of Political Economy, 1985. Jeremy Bulow, John Geanakoplos and Paul Klemperer.



The above papers are kept in order by Maxine Collett. Please send any comments or report any problems to her at